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Antitrust Law-Private Actions: The Supreme
Court Bars Treble-Damage Suits by Indirect Purchasers
In section four of the Clayton Act1 Congress provided that parties
injured as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws could bring a private
action for treble damages against an antitrust violator.2 When the violation
involves price-fixing, 3 the consumer4 of the product is often the one who
bears the additional cost resulting from the overcharge. Because of the
multilevel distribution system employed for the sale of most products in the
United States, however, the higher price resulting from a price-fixing
violation is commonly passed on by intervening purchasers before it reaches
the ultimate consumer. Since 1968, when the Supreme Court held that
defendants in treble-damage actions could not assert in defense that a direct
purchaser-plaintiff had passed on any overcharge to its customers and thus
had not been damaged by the alleged violation, 5 the courts have disagreed 6
on whether that decision should be extended to bar a claim of pass-on7 by a
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
2. The provision for recovery of treble damages was seen as both a remedial provision
and as an incentive to private suits, and thereby an aid to enforcement of the antitrust laws. See
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (Marshall, J.).
3. See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens
Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976). Of the 346 civil and criminal
actions initiated during 1971-1976 by the Department of Justice, 192 involved horizontal price-
fixing (agreements among competitors), and 4 concerned vertical price-fixing, or resale price
maintenance. Id. at 536, 555 (citing TRADE REG. REP. (CCII) for the five year period). Since
treble-damage actions are frequently commenced after a government prosecution for the same
violation, these figures are also a relatively accurate indication of the trend in private actions.
Id. at 634 n.42.
4. The word "consumer" as used in this Note refers to any individual or business entity
buying a product primarily for use rather than for resale. The term "ultimate consumer" or
"final purchaser" refers to the last buyer of a product that has passed through several other
hands-commonly those of the wholesaler and retailer. "Indirect purchaser" refers to anyone
who buys a product from someone other than the manufacturer.
5. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). For a discus-
sion of this case, see text accompanying notes 21-24 infra.
6. Compare text accompanying notes 25-29 with text accompanying notes 30-35.
7. "Pass-on" refers to the theory that an overcharge added to the cost of a product at one
level of the chain of distribution, rather than being absorbed by the buyer at that level, is added
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plaintiff in a treble-damage suit. Contrary to the predictions of most com-
mentators8 and many lower courts, 9 the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois0 has answered that question in the affirmative. Since any pro-
spective plaintiff except the first purchaser of a product must rely on the pass-
on theory to allege an injury from an illegal overcharge, Illinois Brick
appears to have barred treble-damage suits by all indirect purchasers.
The State of Illinois and 700 other governmental entities brought suit
against defendant brick manufacturers, alleging violations of section one of
the Sherman Act.11 Plaintiffs claimed that the arbitrarily high price for
concrete blocks illegally fixed by the manufacturers had been passed on by
the masonry contractors to the general contractors and again by the general
contractors to plaintiffs. 2 Defendant manufacturers moved for summary
judgment against all indirect purchasers of the concrete block. The district
court granted the motion, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing, 3 but the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 14 The Supreme Court, on
on to the price paid by the next buyer in the chain. Assertion of the theory by a plaintiff in a
treble-damage suit is labelled "offensive use of pass-on"; when invoked by a defendant it is a
"defensive use of pass-on." See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2064-65
(1977).
8. See, e.g., McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to
Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PTt. L. REV. 177 (1971); Comment,
Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-on, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976
(1975); Note, Mangano and Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine,
72 COLUM. L. Rev. 394 (1972); Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the
Passing-on Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 98 (1972). But see Handler & Blechman, supra note 3,
at 638-49.
9. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975); In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub norn. Standard Oil
Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971);
Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975), provides in pertinent part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
12. 97 S. Ct. at 2065. Defendants' blocks were bought primarily by masonry contractors,
who built masonry structures under contract to general contractors, who then incorporated
those structures into entire buildings that were sold to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed $3 million in
actual damages, producing a treble-damage claim of $9 million.
13. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. I11. 1975). The district court ruled
that plaintiffs were too remote from the alleged violation to have standing to sue under § 4 of the
Clayton Act because they were indirect purchasers of a product that, after being sold with the
illegal overcharge by the manufacturer, had been incorporated into another product and sold in
a different form. Id. at 468. The court distinguished between "final" consumers, who buy
goods indirectly but in the same condition as when they were originally made and sold, from
"ultimate" consumers, who buy the finished product from a middleman who has altered or
added to the goods. Id. at 467-68. Final consumers, the court noted, were usually granted
standing, ultimate ones only rarely. Id. at 466.
14. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976). The court of appeals also
based its holding on the standing question, but stressed that the broad language of the Clayton
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certiorari, did not reach the standing question, but held that Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 15 was dispositive of the case.16 Justice
White, writing for the Court, 17 rejected both the argument that plaintiffs
should be permitted to use a pass-on theory" and the contention that
Hanover Shoe should be read narrowly to bar the pass-on defense only in its
own factual context of overcharges for capital goods. 19 Instead, he enun-
ciated a per se rule against the use of pass-on theory by any indirect
purchaser.
20
In Hanover Shoe, the most significant prior case dealing with the use
of pass-on theory, 21 the Supreme Court was confronted with the question
whether a defendant in a treble-damage action should be allowed to escape
liability to a direct purchaser by proving that the alleged illegal overcharge
had been passed along to the purchaser's customers.22 The Court, pointing
Act's treble damage provision demanded a more liberal test of standing than the district court
had applied. The standing test should not be used, the Seventh Circuit declared, to bar a
plaintiff who might have difficulty proving its injury. Id. at 1165-66.
15. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2066 n.7.
17. Justice White was also the author of the Hanover Shoe opinion. 392 U.S. at 483.
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2067. This position was taken by the dissenters, Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, the United States as amicus curiae and the lower courts that had
allowed other plaintiffs to use the pass-on theory. Id.
19. This position was argued solely by plaintiffs. Id. at 2066.
20. Id. at 2070. Two limited exceptions to this rule were recognized by the Court. The first
exception, coinciding with the sole exception created in Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494, applies
when a first purchaser has a pre-existing cost-plus contract with its customer, thus establishing
the effect of the overcharge in advance and simplifying the problems of proof. 97 S. Ct. at 2070.
The second exception arises when "the direct purchaser is owned or controlled -by its
customer." Id. at 2070 n.16. But see notes 50 & 51 and text accompanying notes 49-51 infra.
21. Prior to Hanover Shoe, lower courts were divided on the question whether to recog-
nize the pass-on defense. The defense was allowed in the "Oil Jobber Cases," in which
plaintiffs, independent jobbers who bought gas from defendant oil companies, resold it to
service stations at a resale price uniformly fixed according to costs. See Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin
Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Leonard
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th
Cir. 1942). In the "Electrical Cases," however, where defendant electrical equipment manufac-
turers sought to prove that plaintiff utility companies had passed on overcharges in the price of
the equipment to its customers, the defense was denied. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1963); Public Util. Dist. No. I v. General Elec.
Co., 230 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1964); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
In contrast, pre-Hanover Shoe courts generally allowed the use of pass-on theory by
plaintiffs. See, e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th
Cir. 1967); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1967);
Missouri v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
22. Plaintiff Hanover Shoe claimed that defendant United Shoe Machinery, through
its policy of leasing rather than selling machinery, had monopolized the shoe industry and
had forced Hanover to pay more for the machinery than it would have paid under normal
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to the "insurmountable" problems of proving pass-on in most situations and
noting the added complications to treble-damage actions such problems
would entail,13 held that the pass-on defense was barred as a matter of law.
The Court also emphasized the need to preserve the effectiveness of the
treble-damage action as an enforcement and deterrence mechanism: if a
violator could defend against a first purchaser by asserting pass-on, it would
escape liability altogether, since often ultimate consumers would have only
a small stake in any lawsuit that could be brought against a violator and,
accordingly, little incentive to sue.
24
The Hanover Shoe opinion offered little insight into the Court's views
on the use of pass-on by plaintiffs. This question divided the lower courts
for several years. One group of cases, led by Mangano v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. ,25 read Hanover Shoe as barring
indirect purchasers from asserting injury through pass-on. In support of its
ruling, the lower court in Mangano pointed to the Hanover Court's concern
with the difficulties of proving pass-on.26 Plaintiffs in Mangano claimed
that the overcharge had passed through as many as five levels from the
manufacturer of plumbing fixtures to the wholesaler, to the plumbing
contractor, to the builder, to the first homeowner, and often to a subsequent
homeowner. 27 Noting the difficulty of proving that a builder selling a
$20,000-$30,000 house had raised his price to reflect a $10-$20 overcharge
for plumbing fixtures, the court dismissed the indirect purchasers' com-
plaint.28 Other courts that rejected claims by ultimate consumers, rather than
basing their ruling on Hanover Shoe, viewed the issue as one of standing.
Those who sought to show an injury several levels removed from the alleged
violation were held to be too remote to have a sufficient interest to sue under
section four.
29
competitive conditions. United contended that Hanover had suffered no actual injury from the
overcharge because it was fully reflected in the price of the shoes sold to its customers. 392
U.S. at 487.
23. Id. at 493.
24. Id. at 494.
25. 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'g Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also Donson Stores, Inc. v.
American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Travis v. Fairmount Foods Co., 346 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prods. Corp., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
26. 50 F.R.D. at 25-26.
27. Id. at 19-20.
28. Id. at 26. Defendants' motion to dismiss was based on plaintiffs' failure to file answers
to its interrogatories. The motion was granted on this ground, but the district court stated in
addition that Hanover Shoe required dismissal because it had barred the use of pass-on by all
parties. Id. at 30. The court of appeals affirmed on both grounds. 438 F.2d at 1188.
29. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975) (residential
subscribers claimed they paid higher rates as a result of anticompetitive practices in the
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In another line of cases, lower courts concluded that Hanover Shoe
was not intended to bar suits by ultimate consumers. These courts empha-,
sized the policy underlying that decision and maintained that barring plain-
tiffs' claims either under Hanover Shoe or on the basis of a strict rule of
standing would subvert the purpose of the section four treble-damage ac-
tion. 30 In the leading case in this area, In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases,3'1 plaintiffs were governmental entities claiming that asphalt pro-
ducers had illegally raised and maintained the price of liquid asphalt used in
the construction of public roads. The asphalt was bought from defendants by
contractors, who combined it with other ingredients in building the roads.
32
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the consumers in that
case had a substantial interest in the suit, since three million tons of asphalt
and thirty-seven thousand contracts were involved. Furthermore, few of the
contractors involved had come forward to assert their own claim against the
supplier. 33 Nor were they likely to do so, the court reasoned, because of
their dependence upon the supplier and the apparent financial control that it
exerted over many of its contractors. 34 The court noted that "[tihe day is
long past when courts, particularly federal courts, will deny relief to a
deserving plaintiff merely because of procedural difficulties or problems of
apportioning damages."
35
In Illinois Brick, however, it was the Hanover Shoe Court's resolve to
control the complexities of antitrust litigation that determined the outcome
of the case. The other principles espoused in Hanover Shoe-ensuring
enforcement and punishing violators of the antitrust laws- were de-empha-
sized. Rejecting the argument that offensive use of a pass-on theory should
telephonic equipment market); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.
1973) (farmers claimed damage to crop yields as a result of conspiracy among auto manufactur-
ers to eliminate competition in air pollution control devices); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (purchasers of finished animal feed products containing an
antibiotic drug asserted a claim against manufacturers of the drug); United Egg Producers v.
Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consumers of eggs claimed injury from
anticompetitive practices of egg producers).
30. See, e.g., Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976);
Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust
Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973); Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule
Indus., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,484 (S.D. Fla., 1972); cases cited note 9 supra.
31. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 919 (1974).
32. Id. at 194.
33. Id. at 198.
34. Ird.
35. Id. at 201. See also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (approving a
settlement plan involving 66 civil antitrust actions and apportioning damages between direct and
indirect purchasers).
19781
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be permitted, Justice White first asserted that in order to promote consisten-
cy in adjudications the Hanover Shoe rule must apply equally to plaintiffs
and defendants. 36 He then cited two more practical concerns that impelled
the outcome in Illinois Brick. First, he expressed the fear that if indirect as
well as direct purchasers were allowed to recover, defendants would be
exposed to a "serious risk of multiple liability." 3 7 Second, Justice White
reiterated the Hanover Shoe Court's apprehension that the attempt to prove
pass-on would "greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of already
protracted treble-damage proceedings.'"38
The Court attributed its reluctance to abandon the Hanover Shoe rule
or apply it only to instances of overcharges for capital goods, as plaintiffs
proposed, both to stare decisis considerations and to its unchanged belief
that the Hanover Shoe construction of section four would provide the most
effective enforcement mechanism for the antitrust laws.39 Moreover, al-
though the risk to defendants of multiple liability would not be present under
this application of Hanover Shoe,4° the Court foresaw additional complica-
tions that would arise if all potential plaintiffs were permitted to assert
claims based upon a single overcharge. 4
1
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Brennan 42 argued that the majority
had overemphasized the importance of efficiency in the resolution of anti-
trust litigation, since the underlying rationale of the Hanover Shoe deci-
sion-the need to promote the treble-damage action as a deterrent to anti-
trust violators 43---called for permitting plaintiffs to assert pass-on. The
ensuing procedural and evidentiary complications and the risk of multiple
liability, Brennan argued, could be adequately resolved by means of pro-
cedural devices, whereas prohibiting offensive use of pass-on would frus-
trate Congress' purpose in passing the Clayton Act, by reducing the ability
of injured parties to obtain compensation. 44
36. 97 S. Ct. at 2067.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2068.
39. Id. at 2070.
40. Compare text accompanying note 37 supra. When a defendant is allowed to assert
pass-on by the intervening purchasers and is able to prove it, the defendant will be liable only to
the final purchaser.
41. 97 S. Ct. at 2070. The existence of several potential claimants against the defendant,
and the necessity of apportioning any recovery among them, would require compulsory joinder
of all the claimants in a single action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19. This joinder requirement, the
Court feared, "would transform treble-damage actions into massive multiparty litigations
involving many levels of distribution and including large classes of ultimate consumers remote
from the defendant." 97 S. Ct. at 2072.
42. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
97 S. Ct. at 2076.
43. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
44. 97 S. Ct. at 2083-84 (dissenting opinion).
346 [Vol. 56
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In this respect the primary purposes of section four of the Clayton Act
are of critical importance in guiding any evaluation of the Illinois Brick
result. The first objective of the Act is to provide compensation: "Any
person who shall be injured . by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" may sue to recover his damages.45 The fact that a claimant
may recover treble damages, however, indicates a second purpose of the
Act-the punishment of violators and the deterrence of future violations.
Finally, efficiency in administration may be regarded as an inherent goal of
the Act; presumably Congress intended that its two substantive goals would
be implemented swiftly and economically, as well as justly.
In Illinois Brick, the Court appeared chiefly concerned that antitrust
litigation be conducted as efficiently as possible, citing this rationale as the
dispositive principle of the Hanover Shoe decision. Justice White main-
tained that its importance was evident from the fact that the Court had
recognized an exception to the general Hanover Shoe rule for suits based on
pre-existing cost-plus contracts, contracts that make it " 'easy to prove' "
that the direct purchaser has not been damaged by an antitrust violation. 46 It
is also true, however, that when there is a cost-plus contract, the direct
purchaser has the least incentive to sue, while the indirect consumer's injury
is obvious and he is more likely to assert a claim. Thus the exception also
furthers the enforcement objective of the Act. Moreover, if ease of proof
was the reason for allowing the cost-plus exception, one might expect that
the Illinois Brick Court would have allowed other exceptions for situations
in which the "difficulties and uncertainties" of proving pass-on would be
comparatively slight. Justice White, however, specifically rejected other,
proposed exceptions47 on the grounds that some difficulty of proof might
45. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2068 n. 12 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494) (emphasis added by the
Illinois Brick Court).
47. Plaintiffs argued that exceptions should be allowed when middlemen resell goods
without altering them and when contractors add a fixed percentage markup to their costs in
submitting bids. Exceptions were also urged for other situations in which most of the over-
charge would logically be passed on-specifically, when "a price-fixed good is a small but vital
input into a much larger product, making the demand for the price-fixed good highly inelastic."
Id. at 2074.
At least two of these exceptions deserved further consideration by the Court. When
contractors, or retailers, add a fixed percentage markup to their costs, any overcharge incurred
is promptly passed on. Though the extent of the markup may vary with demand conditions,
demand is likely to be inelastic where such a pricing system is being employed; otherwise
profits would decline. Furthermore, expert testimony may be employed to provide estimates of
the elasticity of demand. See Schaeffer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Ac-
tions: An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883,905,916 (1975). Proof of
pass-on would be simplified in that once the amount of the overcharge is proved, and the
percentage markup being employed by the middleman is established, the price change that is
due to the overcharge can be determined. The fact that this pricing system, if the percentage
1978]
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remain and that "the process of classifying various market situations ac-
cording to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved and its susceptibility
to proof in a judicial forum would entail the very problems that the Hanover
Shoe rule was meant to avoid." 8
The only additional exception acknowledged by Justice White, howev-
er, could create as many problems of classification as those he rejected.
After explaining the rationale for the cost-plus exception, he noted :
Another situation in which market forces have been supersed-
ed and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct
purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer. Cf. Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 199 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974).49
The exception as stated is somewhat ambiguous; although it concerns
control of a direct purchaser by its customer, the cases cited describe
situations in which a purchaser is controlled by its supplier. 50 Since the fact
that free "market forces have been superseded" in some manner appears to
have supplied the rationale for the exception, perhaps Justice White intend-
ed to distinguish situations in which control is exerted over a direct pur-
chaser by either its customer or its supplier.51 However it is interpreted, the
markup is fixed, results in greater profits for a middleman when an overcharge has been
imposed provides an additional rationale for allowing ultimate consumers to sue the violator,
since the middleman in this situation has no incentive to do so.
The exception for a price-fixed good that is a small but vital component of a final product
also has merit because of the likelihood that an overcharge on that component will be passed on
to the ultimate consumer. The relatively small price increase in the final product resulting from
an overcharge on a small, irreplaceable part will have little effect on the demand for the
product; therefore pass-on of the overcharge on the component part would be unlikely to
reduce profits. See id. at 921-25. The difficulty of tracing the overcharge through several
market levels would be reduced if a strong presumption of pass-on were allowed on the basis of
expert testimony, rebuttable by a showing of alternative reasons for the price increase by the
intermediate purchasers.
The exception for middlemen who resell price-fixed goods without altering them has less
merit, though initially it appears that proof of pass-on would be simpler in such a situation. This
distinction has been criticized for focusing on a fact (extent of alteration of the product) that has
no economic significance, and thus no influence over a middleman's ability to pass on an
overcharge. See, e.g., id. at 928-30. Other factors, such as costs and elasticity of demand, that
influence the extent of pass-on might vary widely within this category, and present difficulties
of proof in some situations.
48. 97 S. Ct. at 2074.
49. Id. at 2070 n.16.
50. In In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 198, the contractors who con-
structed roads for the indirect-purchaser plaintiffs were controlled by their asphalt supplier,
who was charged with a price-fixing violation. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647
(1969), the wholesaler-direct purchaser exerted control over the retailer and the dealer who
bought from it.
51. In response to several inquiries, the Reporter of Decisions' Office first indicated that
the footnote would be changed to read "supplier." However, Justice White then reconsidered
that proposed change. Telephone conversation with Henry C. Lind, Ass't. Reporter of Dcci-
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exception is certain to provoke frequent, time-consuming litigation on the
issue of whether control is present in a given distribution relationship, and if
so, how much is required to bring the case within the exception to the
Illinois Brick holding.52 The resolution of such issues will require extensive
discovery; indeed, it appears that a motion to dismiss against an indirect-
purchaser plaintiff based on Illinois Brick would be premature unless the
plaintiff has been allowed, when it so moved, to proceed with discovery on
the issue of control. When this lengthy process is completed, and if some
elements of control are found to be present, the court must then decide
whether there is enough control to invoke the exception. Thus the trial court
will encounter the very problems of classification that the Illinois Brick
Court sought to avoid when it rejected other exceptions to its holding.
53
Finally, and ironically, the proof of pass-on would not necessarily be any
easier in many of the situations in which some form of control might be
present than it would be in situations in which no such control existed.54
sions (Sept. 23, 1977). See also AtrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Oct. 27, 1977, at A-3.
The footnote reportedly will remain unchanged. Telephone conversation with Reporter of
Decisions' office (Dec. 19, 1977).
52. For example, in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), cited by Justice White, 97 S.
Ct. at 2068 n.7, the supplier controlled its direct customers through "acquisition of stock, or
indirectly through various financial arrangements, including credit." 487 F.2d at 195. Certainly
when a majority of the stock of the direct purchaser is owned by the manufacturer-supplier, use
of pass-on theory must be permitted the indirect purchaser, since manufacturer and purchaser
are virtually the same corporation. Other types of control through stock, however, may not be
as well-defined, such as ownership of a substantial minority of the stock of one corporation by
another, or the "affiliation" situation, in which a corporation with many of the same sharehold-
ers as the manufacturer buys out the direct purchaser. Furthermore, a manufacturer who
wished to insulate himself from treble-damage actions might try to take advantage of the Illinois
Brick rule by setting up a distributor that it could control indirectly. Though outright ownership
of a distributor would certainly invoke the control exception, if the distributor were "owned"
by a relative or debtor of the manufacturer's majority shareholder, the control is not as readily
identifiable.
Less direct types of control would include certain franchise arrangements, in which there
may be territorial and supply restrictions. In other situations the manufacturer may establish or
influence the retail price of its product. Finally, credit arrangements, as mentioned by the
Western Liquid Asphalt court, id. at 195, are not uncommon in distribution relationships and
could provide frequent instances in which an indirect purchaser might claim that control was
exerted on a direct purchaser by its supplier.
One decision invoking footnote 16 has already been reported. In re Toilet Seat
Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,601 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 1977). Plaintiff lumber
company bought its toilet seats from defendant manufacturer through a purchasing company.
The court concluded that the purchaser acted as an agent controlled by plaintiff because it
purchased materials, for a fee unrelated to the quantity of goods purchased, at a price approved
by plaintiff. The court held that these indirect-purchaser plaintiffs could assert a pass-on
theory. Id. 61,601, at 72,496-97.
53. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
54. Unless the relationship is one of actual ownership, or unless the manufacturer actually
sets the retail price, see note 52 supra, the difficulty of proving pass-on would still depend
primarily on external market factors. See note 47 supra. Of course, the exception is still
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In response to the majority's concern that proving pass-on would
create new dimensions of" complexity in treble-damage actions, Justice
Brennan pointed out that nearly all antitrust cases necessarily involve "mas-
sive evidence and complicated theories." 5 Indeed, initially proving an
overcharge is often just as difficult and complex as is the subsequent burden
of proving it was passed on.56 Nor does the specter of "massive multiparty
litigations" cited by the majority57 pose so immediate and ominous a threat
to the capability of litigants and courts that indirect purchasers should be
denied any opportunity to prove their injuries and damages. As Brennan
noted, ultimate consumers who are so remote that their damages would be
speculative may be barred from court by application of the liberal, "target
area" test of standing. 58 Moreover, some imprecision in assessing damages
has always been tolerated in antitrust cases.
5 9
In discussing Illinois Brick in the context of the punishment purpose of
the statute, the majority opinion focused first on the concern that violators
would be excessively punished: if plaintiffs are allowed to assert pass-on
while defendants are not, both direct and indirect purchasers would be able
to recover the full amount of the overcharge, assuming pass-on could be
proved. 6° Although recognizing that those advocating offensive use of pass-
on would also allow its defensive use when both direct and indirect pur-
chasers attempt to recover in the same lawsuit, 61 and that various procedural
devices could be used to join them in one action, 62 White nevertheless
maintained that there would be no protection against multiple liability when
one claimant had already recovered from the violator by means of a judg-
ment or settlement. 63 He failed to consider alternative methods of dealing
supported by the rationale that since the direct purchaser is unlikely to bring a treble-damage
claim against a supplier that has any amount of control over the purchaser, the indirect
purchaser should be allowed to assert pass-on in those situations.
55. 97 S. Ct. at 2081 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. See also Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The
Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTTRusT BULL. 1183, 1210 (1968).
57. 97 S. Ct. at 2072.
58. Id. at 2082 (dissenting opinion). See also note 84 and accompanying text infra.
59. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2067.
61. Id. at 2067 n.ll.
62. The devices most frequently mentioned include transfer for coordinated pretrial
proceedings under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 1976 & Supp.
1977), see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971); interdistrict transfers of
suits effected under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), (b) (1970); and statutory interpleader, id. § 1335.
63. One court has suggested an apportionment scheme to be used in consolidated actions.
The direct purchaser would recover the amount of the overcharge not passed on, and any lost
profits; the ultimate consumers would recover the remainder of the overcharge, if any, and any
other damages proximately caused. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 201; see 97
S. Ct. at 2067 n.11. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that this possibility is largely
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with this situation, such as barring a later suit by plaintiffs who had failed to
intervene in an action by another class of purchasers, or requiring the
plaintiff who wins a judgment or agrees to a settlement to post bond with the
court or pay the settlement into escrow until the statute of limitations has
run, in the event additional claimants should come forward.' The Court's
excessive concern that defendants be protected from a double recovery thus
results in the denial of any recovery for many injured parties.
65
The Court also maintained that assuring a direct purchaser that he can
recover treble the amount of the entire overcharge-if he can prove a
violation-would provide the most effective enforcement mechanism for the
private antitrust action. 66 It is true that the first purchaser, often a large
wholesaler or "middleman," is usually in a better financial position to
litigate than are the generally smaller and scattered ultimate consumers.
Even though such a middleman may have been able to pass on most of an
overcharge and thus may not have an incentive to bring an action on account
of actual injury, 67 he may be sufficiently attracted by the prospect of a full
treble-damage recovery to undertake the considerable burden of antitrust
litigation. Balanced against this tantalizing reward, however, is the danger
the middleman faces of impairing relations with his supplier. Even when the
supplier does not exert actual financial control over the first purchaser, there
theoretical, since "[t]he extended nature of antitrust actions, often involving years of dis-
covery, combines with the short four-year statute of limitations to make it impractical for
potential plaintiffs to sit on their rights until after entry of judgment in the earlier suit." Id. at
2084 (dissent).
64. See McGuire, supra note 8, at 198-200.
65. Justice White expressly rejected the argument that "it is better for the defendant to
pay six-fold or more damages than for an injured party to go uncompensated." 97 S. Ct. at 2067
n. 11. Yet several commentators have noted that treble damages are unlikely to equal a defend-
ant's wrongful profits, largely because the violator has typically enjoyed interest-free use of his
ill-gotten gains for several years before a judgment is rendered against him, and antitrust
plaintiffs are denied prejudgment interest on their recoveries. See, e.g., Schaeffer, supra note
47, at 911-12.
66. 97 S. Ct. at 2070, 2074-75.
67. The majority contended that because the first purchaser operates in an imperfectly
competitive market, he would be forced to absorb some, and "often most" of the overcharge.
Id. at 2073, 2075. Economic theory suggests the contrary, however-that an overcharge would
generally be passed on at least in part, in all types of competitive structures, resulting in higher
retail prices. See e.g., J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 141, 145, 198 (2d ed. 1966).
When demand for a product is inelastic, a middleman's profits will be unaffected if he
passes on the overcharge to his customers. Though elasticity of demand will of course vary
throughout the market, price-fixing violations are more likely to occur when an intermediate
purchaser can pass on the overcharge to his customers. In that event the intermediate pur-
chaser would have less incentive to expend his resources in detecting the violation, and the
profit accruing to the price-fixer would be greater when demand is inelastic, since any drop in
the quantity sold as a result of the overcharge would be relatively small. Schaeffer, supra note
47, at 897-900.
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is often a comfortable business relationship between the two, beneficial to a
buyer, that he would be reluctant to jeopardize.
68
In addition, the Court was concerned that requiring apportionment of
any prospective recovery, in the event subsequent purchasers join the
middleman in suing his supplier, would further reduce the latter's incentive
to sue, and thus further impair enforcement. 69 The present uncertainty as to
whether a middleman will sue at all, however, appears to be at least as great
a risk to enforcement prospects--especially since the likely alternative,
under the Illinois Brick holding, is that no purchaser, direct or indirect, will
bring a suit and the violator will go unpunished. 70 Allowing both direct and
indirect purchasers to attempt to prove their damages would at least encour-
age enforcement of the antitrust laws by the party who is often the one most
seriously injured by an overcharge, the ultimate consumer, and thus has the
greatest incentive to assert a claim against the violator. Middlemen who
have suffered a substantial loss would still have the lure of a substantial
recovery, and their problems of proof would not be compounded by the
addition as parties to the suit of indirect purchasers, who would have the
burden of proving pass-on before recovering.
The Illinois Brick opinion indicates that the compensation objective of
the treble damage action was of minimal concern to the Court. Justice White
recognized that the majority's rule denies recovery to indirect purchasers
who may have been actually injured by antitrust violations, 7' but apparently
68. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 198; Wheeler, Antitrust
Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1325, 1330-32 (1973). Some
direct purchasers may actually have benefited from the overcharge. See Schaeffer, supra note
47, at 914.
69. 97 S. Ct. at 2074-75.
70. One commentator asserts that even when pass-on is not explicitly invoked, it is an
implicit factor in the calculation of damages in almost every damage action. Pollock, supra note
56, at 1189. This was borne out in an ironic conclusion to the "Plumbing Fixtures" litigation,
Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), in
which indirect purchasers were barred from asserting pass-on. A subsequent settlement be-
tween the manufacturers and some direct purchasers was appealed by the direct purchasers,
who claimed that the district court had not considered their data on overcharges, quantities and
prices. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit conceded that the relevant data had not been
considered, but noted, "[W]e cannot say that such proof would have been too significant
here. . . . [A]mong the numerous factors dictating approval was the fact that the claims of this
class were minimized by the probability that overcharges made upon them were passed on to
their customers." Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1971).
Thus, the defendants not only managed to escape liability altogether to the ultimate purchasers,
but were also liable for merely reduced damages to the direct purchasers on the theory that the
legally injured parties passed on their losses to the same ultimate purchasers. If this is a
representative case with respect to proof of damages in such a situation, a middleman who can
demonstrate no actual damages will be at a substantial disadvantage in settlement negotiations
of a private antitrust suit.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2075.
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felt that this was an unavoidable consequence of emphasizing the efficiency
and deterrence objectives of the Clayton Act. It may be true that, as he
stated, "Hanover Shoe does further the goal of compensation to the extent
that the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of the
overcharge";72 economic reality suggests that that extent will be small
indeed. 73 It is more likely that "[t]he economic burden of most antitrust
violations is borne by the consumers in the form of higher prices for goods
and services." 74 Regardless of which is the better view, it is apparent that
the dissent has accurately interpreted the intent of Congress in giving
priority to the goal of compensating the injured. 75 The recently enacted
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197676 clearly indicates
Congress' intention to emphasize compensation for injured consumers by
authorizing state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae on behalf of the
states' citizens against antitrust violators. 77 Of more direct significance for
Illinois Brick, a new bill has been introduced in both houses of Congress
that would amend the Clayton Act to expressly overrule Illinois Brick and
thus provide a remedy for indirect purchasers.
78
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick elevated the goal of efficiency in
treble-damage litigation, to the resulting detriment of the compensation
objective, in pursuit of a punishment-deterrence approach that is of dubious
merit. Rather than providing for some flexibility in determining which
plaintiffs might have a substantial and deserving claim, the majority for-
mulated a rigid, per se rule that bars virtually all ultimate-consumer plain-
tiffs from attempting to prove an injury.
72. Id.
73. See note 67 supra.
74. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976), quoted in 97 S. Ct. at 2080 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
75. This discussion will be limited to Congress' intentions as illustrated in the Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15(b)-(h), 16, 18(a), 26, 1311, 1407 (West Supp.
1977), and in legislation now being considered by Congress. The true intention of the Congress
that passed the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914 with regard to the compensa-
tion of injured consumers is less clear. See, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2068, 2069 n.14 (majority); id. at
2079-80 (dissent).
76. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394-96
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15(b)-(h), 16, 18(a), 26, 1311, 1407 (West Supp. 1977)).
77. See, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2080, 2081 (dissent). Since the great majority of consumers are
indirect purchasers, the Illinois Brick decision seriously undermines the purpose of this legisla-
tion.
78. S. 1874 & H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S 12309 (daily ed. July 15,
1977). This bill is sponsored by Senator Kennedy and Representative Rodino. That the measure
is directed specifically at this decision is obvious by virtue of a provision that it be retroactive to
June 9, 1977-the day the Illinois Brick opinion was handed down. Id. This provision was
included at the suggestion of Senator Hugh Scott, who explained, "The Court deserves to have
its attention respectfully recalled to the will of the Congress." Proposed Amendments to the
Clayton Act: Hearings on S. 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977-1978), quoted in TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH), July 25, 1977, at 2.
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The Illinois Brick holding not only denies compensation to large
groups of parties injured by antitrust violations, it also fails to achieve the
desired efficiency in antitrust litigation. By recognizing an exception to its
holding for situations in which control is exerted over one party in a
distribution relationship,79 the Court has created a gap in the Illinois Brick
rule that is potentially as broad as the rule itself. Plaintiffs that would
otherwise be barred at the outset of a treble-damage suit against a manufac-
turer may be encouraged by the exception to move for discovery and litigate
the control issue, thus consuming much of the court time that was gained by
barring all other indirect purchasers. Moreover, the vague definition of the
exception provides trial courts with great latitude in making the determina-
tion of "control" 80 and thereby invites inconsistent decisions.
Furthermore, the ruling may have effects on the organization of the
economy that are undesirable in terms of the goals of the antitrust laws.
Manufacturers who engage in price fixing might be encouraged by the
Illinois Brick holding to attempt to insulate themselves from any treble-
damage action by setting up a direct purchaser that the manufacturer actually
controls in some indirect manner, hoping to avoid the sweep of the control
exception. Retailers, to preserve their claim in the event of a price-fixing
violation by a manufacturer, might seek to employ a common purchasing
agent, rather than obtaining goods through an independent middleman. To
that extent the Illinois Brick holding, read in light of the control exception,
appears to foster both vertical integration and horizontal collaboration in the
economy.
The difficulties of proof, problems of apportionment and risk of multi-
ple liability that the Court foresaw would indeed present obstacles to the
resolution of treble-damage suits by indirect purchasers. But if compensa-
tion of the injured is acknowledged as a priority of the Clayton Act, as the
language of the Act itself suggests,81 the Court should have attempted to
resolve these problems in a manner that would entail less drastic repercus-
sions for injured consumers. The risk of multiple liability for defendants is
not great as a practical matter and could generally be prevented through
procedural safeguards.8 2 In any event, the protection of antitrust violators
should not take precedence over the compensation of those they have
injured. Neither does the difficulty of apportioning damages among differ-
ent claimants justify barring all except one class of plaintiffs from bringing a
79. See notes 50-52 and text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
80. See note 52 supra.
81. See note 1 supra.
82. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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treble-damage action. The task of apportionment could be simplified some-
what if a bifurcated trial system is used; gross liability could be determined
in one trial, and the recovery could be apportioned among plaintiffs in a
second proceeding, in which defendants would not be required to take part.
Moreover, both apportionment problems and difficulties of proof could
be alleviated somewhat by the use of the requirement of standing under
section four to eliminate the most remote plaintiffs. 83 Lower courts, aware
of the need to place some limits on the statute's broad wording, have
employed standing tests in a, generally equitable, pragmatic manner, inquir-
ing whether prospective plaintiffs have been injured to a sufficiently direct,
foreseeable and substantial extent before permitting them to put on their
proof. 84 There will be many treble-damage actions in which the interests of
83. The Illinois Brick Court stated that it would not reach the question of standing, but
noted that "the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for
purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained
injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4." 97 S. Ct. at 2066 n.7.
Assuming the validity of this statement, the Court's determination of "which persons have
been injured," made in the interest of expediency rather than accuracy, nevertheless has the
same effect as denial of standing to a plaintiff, but is more damaging because it does so for the
wrong reasons. Standing concerns the ability to allege injury to an interest protected by the
statute, not to prove such injury. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969);
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148-51 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust
Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74, 680, at 94,978-79 (D. Conn. 1973); Boshes v. General Motors
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 594, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
84. Two distinguishable approaches have generally been used by the courts to determine
whether a plaintiff is one injured "by reason of" an antitrust violation. The "direct injury"
approach focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and requires privity
between the two as an element of standing. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir.
1910). The "target area" approach is the more modern and widely followed method today.
Courts employing this approach in effect inquire whether the plaintiff is "within that area of the
economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951). For
a thorough discussion of the two approaches and the cases employing them, see In re Multidis-
trict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126-29 (9th Cir. 1973).
The target area approach is the most promising as a tool for eliminating plaintiffs whose
claims would be virtually impossible to prove and would thus needlessly waste the courts' time.
As one district court judge explained, "The target area test is essentially a measure of
remoteness of injury resulting from antitrust violations. In most cases it serves to eliminate
those plaintiffs whose business relationship with defendants is so attenuated as to render the
alleged injury negligible or highly speculative." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
61,360, at 71,268 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1474 (8th Cir. June 20,
1977). For instances in which some variation of the target area test was employed to eliminate
remote plaintiffs, see cases cited in note 29 supra. For circumstances in which the test has been
the basis for finding plaintiffs had standing, see In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d
191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 919 (1974)
(defendant asphalt producers sold asphalt to contractors for use in building highways on
contract to plaintiff); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967) (State
bought corrugated culverts made by defendant from contractors who built highways); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 934 (1966) (milk producers sued wholesale and retail grocers for selling milk from their
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large, multi-level groups of consumers and middlemen will be implicated
and in which the problems of proving pass-on may be insurmountable.
There will, however, be others in which ultimate consumers will be the most
seriously injured parties, will have suffered appreciable damages and will be
well prepared to meet their burden of proof.85 An initial standing threshold
would permit such plaintiffs to press their claims, without burdening the
courts with frivolous or unnecessarily complex suits. When the standing
requirement would not bar a class of plaintiffs so large as to be unmanage-
able, a court could refuse to certify the suit as a class action.8 6 These
procedural bars, though perhaps not as simple to implement as the Illinois
Brick rule, would permit the courts to promote all the objectives fostered by
the treble-damage suit as the circumstances of each case require.
MARTHA JOHNSTON MCDONALD
Civil Rights-Title VII and the Religious Employee:
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison Retrenches
on the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include a
requirement that an employer "reasonably accommodate" his employees'
religious practices or observances unless doing so would cause an "undue
own plant at a loss); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (defendant made zipper sliders and sold them to zipper manufacturers who sold to
plaintiff); Washington v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965) (public utility
sued defendant for overchares on 10 eenerators sold it throuh a contractor).
85. One such case, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,360 (D. Minn. Mar.
31, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1474 (8th Cir. June 20, 1977), was recently decided in a
federal district court. A purchaser of a hearing aid brought a class action suit against the
manufacturer for resale price maintenance, alleging that defendants sold hearing aids to select-
ed retail dealers for approximately $100 and set the price to consumers at about $350. Brief for
Appellee at 18. If footnote 16 of Illinois Brick, 97 S. Ct. at 2070 n.16, is interpreted to include
control by a supplier, this case should be one of the exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule. See
notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra. Resale price maintenance, if proved, would surely
be recognized as "control" of a retailer by a manufacturer. If the footnote is read to include
only "customer" control of a direct purchaser, however, the broad language of the decision
might bar the consumer plaintiffs in this case despite their success in establishing their standing
in the district court, simply because they are "indirect purchasers." Because this situation, if
plaintiff can prove her allegations of resale price maintenance, does not require the use of pass-
on theory, it seems particularly unfair to bar the plaintiff under the Illinois Brick rule, before
any proof may be offered.
86. See, e.g., Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. I1, 1973) (retail
consumers of automobiles had standing to sue for alleged overcharges but proposed class of 30
to 40 million car buyers rejected as unmanageable).
